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Whaling in Europe is dependent on the continued
willingness of governments to fund it at a loss.
Blog Admin
Hunting whales for commercial purposes has been prohibited by international treaties since
the 1980s. Despite this, several countries, including Norway and Iceland, still participate in
whaling. Ian Hurd assesses the continued existence of whaling in Europe, noting that due
to falling demand for whale products, the practice generally relies on government subsidies.
Tackling the incentives which encourage governments to support whaling may help to
further reduce the market for whale products.
The market f or whale products is today a tiny f raction of  what it was in the f irst half  of
the 20th century. This is true both in terms of  international trade and domestic consumption in every
country. From a peak in the 1930s, the annual catch of  whales around the world has f allen f rom over
40,000 per year to perhaps 3,000 per year today. The f all is of  course due to a combination of
dramatically depleted stocks, the rise of  anti-whaling rules and norms, and the substitution of  non-whale
products in f uel, f ood, and industrial products. How these three f orces are related to each other remains
greatly debated, but it is clear that all three have worked in the same direction: downward.
The whale hunting that remains is extremely controversial. It exists in the f ace of  these three strong
countervailing f orces: international norms, international regulation, and vanishing markets. The
international legal regime on whale hunting is f ormed by the intersection of  the CITES treaty (on the
trade in endangered species) and the International Convention f or the Regulation of  Whaling (ICRW –
1946). The ICRW created the International Whaling Commission (IWC) which sets quotas on whale
catches f or its members.
The overall ef f ect of  the regime is that today
hunting whales f or commercial purposes is
f orbidden (by the IWC) and the international
trade of  whale products is banned f or those
species that are considered endangered (by
CITES). However, these treaties apply in a
country only to the extent that the
government has agreed to it, and this extent
varies greatly, which makes the legal and
polit ical terrain very complicated. To
understand contemporary whale hunting it is
necessary to pay attention to the
peculiarit ies of  each whale-hunting country
and their relationship to the international
system.
Who Hunts Whales in Europe?
Four polit ical entit ies in Europe currently engage in whale hunting: Iceland, Norway, Greenland, and the
Faroe Islands. All are members of  the International Whaling Commission and none is a member of  the
European Union. The f our have distinct industrial structures and legal arrangements f or whaling and
need to be examined individually bef ore making any generalisations.
Norway reports that its whalers took 533 whales in 2011, though the government issued permits f or
around 1,200 whales. These are minke whales, which are hunted in the summer months of f  the northern
coasts of  Norway. They are hunted f rom small boats using grenades attached to harpoons, which are
shot f rom cannons into the thorax of  the whale. The meat is almost all sold and consumed locally, with
small quantit ies exported to the Faroe Islands and (in recent years) to Japan.
Iceland hunts minke whales (about 215 in 2012) in the North Atlantic, as well as f in whales. The minke
whale is consumed locally in Iceland, while the f in whales are exported to Japan. Fin whales are classif ied
as endangered species by the CITES treaty. They are an ‘Appendix I species’ in CITES, meaning that they
are “threatened with extinction” and international trade in their products is illegal. The number of  f in
whales killed in Iceland’s hunt spiked to 148 in 2010, but seems likely to return to zero given the f ailure of
the Japanese market af ter 2011.
Greenland and the Faroe Islands are both parts of  the Kingdom of  Denmark, but f or whaling matters
(and much more) they are autonomous f rom the Danish government. They allow whale hunting even
though Denmark itself  does not. (This makes f or a dif f icult posit ion f or the Danish representative at the
International Whaling Commission meetings, who must speak on behalf  of  all three entit ies). Greenland
has a seasonal whale hunt by aboriginal groups, taking about 100 minke and 10 f in whales per year,
along with a small number of  bowhead and humpback whales.
The Faroe Islands’ hunt is distinctive in that it takes place on-shore af ter the whales have been chased
by small boats and made to beach themselves. About 1,000 pilot whales are killed this way each summer,
and the practice takes the f orm of  a community f estival. The whale meat is then taken home by the
participants. It is theref ore mainly consumed by those who participate in the activity and does not enter
into a market.
Together, these f our territories kill about 2,000 whales per year. The other whaling countries around the
world kill about 1,500 more. This is mostly done by Japan (about 1,200, mainly in the southern ocean),
but also in smaller numbers by aboriginal groups in Russia (about 150 per year) and the US (about 100
per year), and by a handf ul of  other countries.
The International Whaling Commission
All the main players in large-scale whale hunting are members of  the International Whaling Commission
and its rules are theref ore the starting point f or their activit ies. The most important component of  the
whaling regime is the ban on commercial whale hunting. This came about af ter the IWC reduced the
annual catch quota of  whales to zero in the mid-1980s. This represented a victory f or anti-whaling
nations and activists.
However, there are two big caveats to the IWC’s quota system. First, the quota applies only to
“commercial” catches. Hunting f or commercial purposes is regulated collectively by the IWC, but f or other
kinds of  whale hunting, the IWC allows national governments to decide on their own catch limits. In
particular, the treaty recognises that governments may issue permits f or whaling that is carried out in the
interest of  scientif ic research (Article VIII(1)) and f or whaling done by aboriginal groups. The size of
these permits is a national decision f or individual governments and not the collective responsibility of  the
IWC.
Second, the treaty contains an opt-out clause that applies to amendments. This was designed to protect
signatories f rom changes in the treaty that might af f ect their interests. Decisions at the IWC are taken by
a two-thirds majority vote, and so Article V(3) of  the ICRW allows governments in the minority to declare
that they will not be bound by the change. As the IWC shif ted f rom a pro-whaling to an anti-whaling
majority by the 1980s, several pro-whaling states invoked Article 5. By declaring that it objects to the
change in quotas, a member has a legal path by which it can claim that the whaling moratorium has no
ef f ect on it.
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Among the European whalers, Norway and
Iceland have lodged such objections to the
quota moratorium. They are theref ore in the
strange legal posit ion of  being members of
the International Whaling Commission, but
not obligated by its central rule. Greenland
authorises its whale hunts under the
aboriginal exemption. It has recently f aced
trouble justif ying this authorisation in view of
the f act that whale meat is available in many
retail markets, making it appear that the hunt
has a commercial purpose rather than
existing purely f or aboriginal subsistence. At
the IWC meetings in 2010, the other
representatives of  EU states made a f ormal objection to Greenland’s aboriginal permit system. Finally,
the hunt in the Faroe Islands targets pilot whales, which are not within the IWC’s legal purview — small
cetaceans (such as dolphins) are not regulated by the IWC, and the Faroese claim that pilot whales
should be included in this category. Theref ore, the Faroe Islands does not provide f urther legal
justif ication to the organisation f or its behaviour.
The international trade in whale products is constrained f urther by other international regulations,
including CITES and European Union rules. The CITES agreement bans exports and imports of  products
derived f rom those whale species which it recognises as endangered. As noted above, this includes f in
whales, but does not include minke whales. The EU has banned all imports of  whale products since 1982
(not only those that are endangered). The IWC also regulates some aspects of  international trade in that
it f orbids members f rom trading in whale products with non-IWC countries. The ef f ect of  this rule is to
induce whale-hunting states to remain inside the organisation: because Japan, the main international
market f or whale products, is a member, it is necessary that those countries hoping to export whale
products remain members as well.
The European Union has an impact on whaling in two f urther ways, even though none of  the European
whalers is an EU member. First, and most directly, it bans commercial whale hunting and whale imports by
its members. Thus, this large market is unavailable to Icelandic and Norwegian f irms wishing to export
whale products, and any expansion in European whaling will come f rom the existing whale hunting
territories and not f rom EU Member States. Second, the prospect of  joining the EU appears to be closed
to these entit ies as long as they continue to be whale hunters. While it remains to be seen how this
might change in the f uture, at present commercial whale hunting is an absolute bar to EU membership.
The issue has been raised directly in the negotiations over Iceland’s accession, where the Commission
noted that f or f urther progress to happen, “necessary steps will need to be undertaken as regards to
the protection of  cetaceans.”
States and Markets
Consumer demand f or whale meat is very low by historic standards and only shows signs of  f alling
f urther. While it is dif f icult to gain reliable inf ormation on whale purchases and consumption, there is
strong circumstantial evidence that the retail market has shrunk considerably across the main consumer
countries. Among other indicators are a f alling retail price (in Japan and in Norway), reports of  growing
stockpiles of  f rozen meat in warehouses, periodic government intervention to destroy these stockpiles,
and government f unds f or marketing campaigns to promote whale as a f ood product. All of  these
suggest an oversupply relative to demand.
It is interesting also that the market f or whale products is increasingly local rather than global —
consumption is now typically closely connected to hunting, where communities that hunt are also those
that consume; prices tend to be local rather than international; and trade is a small component of
production. One can see here the reverse of  what we typically associate with contemporary globalisation.
This marks a dramatic change f or an industry that is of ten seen as an archetypal example of  the f irst
wave of  globalisation in the early 20th century.
As markets have disappeared, European whaling is now dependent on government subsidies of  various
kinds, f rom permits to market support to vessel subsidies to marketing. The same is true of  Japanese
whaling. Theref ore, the continued existence of  the practice as an industrial enterprise depends on the
continued willingness of  the state to f und it at a loss. This support presumably f ollows f rom the
calculation by the governments that they are serving some important constituency, either electoral or
economic, by this support, and varies by country.
Future Strategies
The key role of  governments in perpetuating national whale hunts suggests a number of  strategies that
might help reduce whale hunting in the f uture. First and most obviously, governments that are committed
to austerity budgets might wisely look at whaling subsidies as relatively easy places to save some
money. The economic return f rom whaling is not strong, and so these subsidies, while small, are logically
at the top of  the list of  things to be cut.
Second, Iceland’s EU accession negotiations help to show how the EU might provide some polit ical
‘cover ’ f or governments that seek to end their whaling subsidies. The EU could take the heat if  the
Icelandic government chose to end its whale hunt. This is analogous to the way in which borrowing
countries of ten blame the International Monetary Fund f or unpopular policy changes that the government
would have carried out regardless.
Finally, constitutional norms on the rule of  law seem to work against the whale hunt, and this may help to
shrink the market f or whale meat even f urther. Whale hunting states are committed to certain legal
categories (such as ‘scientif ic research’ and ‘aboriginal use’) which they f ind dif f icult to sustain in
practice. When whales killed under aboriginal permits turn up in grocery stores, whalers and their
governments f ind themselves having to of f er a def ence against the accusation that whaling is carried
out f or commercial purposes. Similarly, Japan’s ‘scientif ic permit’ system depends on continually justif ying
the whale hunt as necessary f or scientif ic research, and this grows increasingly dif f icult as time goes on.
It may theref ore be a usef ul strategy to use domestic legal institutions to hold governments to their own
rules and statements, or to use the International Court of  Justice to hold them to their international legal
commitments (as Australia has done toward Japan).
Each of  these strategies takes advantage of  the f act that the tide seems to have turned against
whaling, in the economic, cultural, and legal domains. Pro-whaling legal justif ications are increasingly
costly, given the broad normative shif t against whaling and the consequent evaporation of  consumer
demand. No doubt some governments will continue to be willing to pay f or a domestic whaling industry,
but the best evidence suggests that the price of  doing so is rising.
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